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Shifting 
boundaries: 
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community 
and the 
"non-Greek-
speaking 
Greeks" 
Haris Exertzoglou 
I. Recent studies on nation and nationalism 
have raised important questions about the 
nature of nation as a particular kind of 
community. This highly suggestive literature 
focuses on the institutional, political and 
technical aspects of nation building and looks 
into the social transformations and 
modernising state policies which paved the 
ground for the rise of nations in the modern 
era. In the same vein nationalism is treated as 
an ideology or form of politics that is 
specifically modern.1 
In this context, the centrality of the concept of 
the nation as a creation of modernity is 
contrasted to representations of the nation as 
a transhistorical subject, common in 
nationalist literature. Thus, a distinction has 
been established between critical 
conceptualisations of the nation as a modern 
construct and its ideology bound, nationalist 
counterparts. This distinction, however, 
typically leads to the disregard of nationalist 
discourses and rhetoric as valid objects of 
historical analysis.2 Furthermore, it tends to 
obscure the discursive practices whereby 
specific cultural features are privileged within 
particular nationalist discourses, their 
interplay, as well as the way specific groups 
are conceptually classified within particular 
communities. These remarks are not 
intended as a rejection of the thesis that 
holds the nation as a product of modernity. 
My point is that particular attention should be 
paid to the discourses which shaped nations 
as a meaningful reality so as to grasp the 
concrete effectivity of nationalist 
representations of community. If we think of 
national discourses as simply rhetorical 
tropes devoid of any effect,3 their working as 
meaning production systems is entirely lost. 
I take nationalist discourse as a modern, 
authoritative system of representation that 
connects things according to specific 
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matter, is embedded in a power/knowledge nexus.4 It always operates at an institutional level, 
be it the academy, state institutions, political parties directly associated with national states, or 
scientific, literary, historical and political associations operating in other state formations. By 
privileging a conception of the nation as the ordering principle of reality, nationalist discourse 
forged a new thinkable order of things whereby cultural and social experience, notions of time, 
space and community assumed a novel significance. Here a specific relation between discourse 
and reality is operative. Nationalist discourse purports to express a preconstituted national 
entity which is accorded an objective pre- and extra-discursive status, an entity whose values, 
qualities and dispositions are deemed recoverable and knowable because real. In fact, rather 
than expressing an already existing community, nationalist discourse constitutes it by signifying 
aspects of experience as objective signs of national existence. Thus, the important thing is not 
raw experience but its particular interpretation, not reality as such but the meaning assigned to 
it. This could happen when particular, that is selected, questions are asked in relation to a 
specific vision of the community in mind by specific groups of intellectuals and bureaucrats who 
present themselves as expressing "national interests". In addressing historical, linguistic and 
cultural issues necessary to produce truth claims about the national community in view, this 
discourse shapes the form and direction of cognitive fields such as history, linguistics and 
ethnography. As such, nationalist discourse not only constructs its own symbolic realm where 
everything is measured against a nationally meaningful order of things. It also develops the 
cognitive tools to control and corroborate it. This link between nationalist discourse and 
knowledge entails neither the view that this discourse simply subjected aspects of knowledge 
under its ideological hold and therefore those cognitive fields influenced by discourse should not 
be counted as true, scientific knowledge, nor that discourse by rectifying its errors and 
classifying its formulations, through its association to these cognitive fields, undid its relations 
with ideology. In the first place any clear distinction between ideology and knowledge is 
impossible. It is crucial to understand how nationalist discourse controlled meaning and 
imposed its own representations of reality through its connection with the aforementioned 
cognitive fields, despite, or maybe because of, its ideological status. That is why I give particular 
importance to the operations of selection, omissions and exclusion that underpin the portrayal 
of the national landscape. 
Two examples will serve to clarify my point. A crucial element of nationalist discourse is the 
establishing of national continuity - a precondition of representing the nation as subject of 
history. The vision of continuity is indispensable to any nationalist discourse. For our purposes 
the issue is not whether national continuity can be really affirmed. It cannot. The issue is the 
interpretation of this discursive construction as a series of successive integrations of historical 
periods and cultural features aiming at representing the nation as "it really was". Language is the 
second example. It is already well established that within the 19th century nationalist intellectual 
tradition language is considered an objective criterion of community. Such a conception is not 
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without consequences. If language is taken as an objective criterion of national community then 
all its other historically important uses are eventually downplayed and with them all other 
"prenational" forms of community based on religion and locality also disappear. 
However, it would be wrong to take nationalist discourse as a discursive practice that works 
only in continuities. Instead nationalist discourse should be analysed in terms of discontinuity 
as well, and at this point it is better to speak of discourses rather than discourse. Discourses do 
not simply build a commonly acceptable vision of national community. In the long run this vision 
is the product of competition among discourses each claiming truth status for its own account. 
In other words different discourses tend to accommodate different versions of national identity. 
This competition can be conceived as a dynamic field where separate discourses conceptualise 
identity criteria and perceptions of time and space and produce different versions of national 
community. Domination of one discourse requires its imposing its own classifications and 
perceptions over the others. But this is not necessarily a linear process, in the sense that it is 
usually discontinuous both with other and previous discourses. Yet, the final testing ground to 
arrange these discourses hierarchically is not only their rhetorical vigor, cohesion or power of 
representation but how powerful their reach is in the national political arena. Nationalist 
discourses do not limit themselves in establishing truth claims about the national community 
but they also take the form of mediators representing its political interests. Having established 
the legitimacy of the national community in consideration, nationalist discourses defended its 
cultural peculiarity by putting forward specific political claims and shaping political action in 
terms of national interests. At this level the interaction of discourses with politics is very tight, 
and politics becomes a matter of establishing who represents national interest. Yet, what 
qualified as "national interest" was far from unequivocal. What is important is to grasp how 
discourses shaped those interests at the same time that they appear to embody and represent 
them faithfully. Hegemony belonged to the discourse which not only made its own versions of 
national interests most appealing but shaped politics and action accordingly. 
II. In this brief article I will attempt to elaborate some of these issues by addressing a specific 
question: that of the "non-Greek-speaking Greek" communities, speaking mostly Slavic, Vlach 
and Albanian but also Turkish and Arabic, and the way they were treated in Greek nationalist 
discourse. The question of "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" can be illuminated if one sets it against 
the context of the gradual construction of the dominant conception of Greek national identity. I 
will discuss this later on, but right now it is necessary to stress that this concept accommodated 
both language and religion. The Greek national community was conceived as a community that 
shared specific cultural features, especially the use of the Greek language and adherence to 
Orthodox Christianity. However this concept was not applied exclusively to the populations 
included in the Greek state at the moment of its foundation in 1830/1828. It was extended to 
include the Greek-speaking Orthodox communities still living within the boundaries of the 
Ottoman state. Therefore, many Ottoman Christian communities were thought of as part of the 
Greek nation as a consequence of their particular linguistic and religious features. 
It was in the late 19th century that definitions of the Greek national community not based on 
language first appeared, to proliferate rapidly in the early 20th century. "[L]anguage...is not 
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among the essential national characteristics," I. Kalostipis pointed out in 1886. "Language does 
not always indicate race/nation," claimed Ch. Cristovassilis in 1903. "Spoken language is not 
an adequate sign to define race [nation]," remarked Professor Kepetzis in a speech delivered in 
1904. "[I] am not certain whether spoken language necessarily proves the nationality of a 
people," argued Ion Dragoumis. "Besides,... language is always of secondary importance for 
determining nationality," wrote A. Spiliotopoulos in his treatise on the "Vlachophone Greeks". In 
1919, a veteran of the Macedonian struggle, K. Mazarakis-Aenian, repeated that "[IJanguage is 
not a feature of race or nationality, especially in the East."5 
Such statements are remarkable not only because they were uttered by major figures of the 
Greek nationalist intelligentsia, but also because they present sharp departures from previous 
understandings. All in all, such statements underline a new direction of the Greek nationalist 
discourse which was based on a reconceptualisation of the linguistic criterion of nationality. 
This direction can only be understood in connection with emerging concepts of Greek national 
interests and political claims in Ottoman Macedonia and elsewhere. Strictly speaking the 
dislocation of language from its primary position in the structuring of national identity was a 
response to the "discovery" of non-Greek-speaking Christian communities and the need to 
accommodate them within the boundaries of the Greek national community. 
Reference to "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" in Ottoman Macedonia and other Balkan provinces 
appeared frequently during the 1870s.6 This sudden interest can be explained. The 
establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 contesting as it did the ecclesiastical hierarchy 
of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Constantinople upset many Christian communities and proved to 
have long term effects. The major problem, however, was that ecclesiastical divisions did not 
follow linguistic lines of demarcation. Although the Exarchate appealed to Slavic-speaking 
communities, large numbers of Slavic-speaking Christians remained faithful to Constantinople. 
"Non-Greek-speaking Greeks" acquired further political importance during the late 1870s as an 
effect of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-78. Russia's attempts to create a large Bulgarian 
state was founded upon linguistic criteria and Slavic-speaking Christians were thought to be part 
of the Bulgarian nation. Given the existing national aspirations of other Balkan states in the area, 
the clauses of the San Stefano Treaty (1878) were met with widespread opposition, mostly in 
Greece and Serbia. In this complex combination of emerging rival national claims and 
perceptions of national belonging in Ottoman Macedonia, Greek diplomatic personnel prepared 
reports aiming at the classification of the Christian populations according to "nationality". 
However, in the face of the predominance of the linguistic criterion such classifications proved 
to be a demanding exercise as the bulk of the Christian populations were non-Greek-speaking. 
The use of the Greek language was limited to the urban centers and southern parts of Ottoman 
Macedonia, while in the countryside non-Greek dialects (Slavic, Vlach, Turkish and Albanian) 
were mostly used. In this juncture, non-Greek-speaking Christian communities, speaking mostly 
Slavic and Vlach, were officially incorporated in the Greek national community.7 As national 
rivalries in Macedonia increased, the category of "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" was extended to 
include other Christian communities, mainly Turkish and Albanian-speaking Christians. During 
the 1880s the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs received many similar reports prepared by 
diplomatic'personnel in various Ottoman cities in Macedonia, Thrace and Epirus.8 
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Political expedience apart, the admission of non-Greek-speaking Christians within the Greek 
national community was due to the dominant ideological discourse where almost everything 
was interpreted in national terms. Greek diplomats, hard pressed to produce convincing 
evidence sustaining the Greek claims, took loyalty to the Orthodox Patriarchate as equivalent to 
loyalty to the Greek national cause. Such a position, however convenient, introduced a novelty 
as it was tacitly acknowledged that the specific groups thought as part of the Greek national 
community were deprived of the most distinctive feature of the nation: language. Given the 
prevalent conception of language in Greek national identity, such an acknowledgment presented 
a serious challenge to the dominant national discourse. The already established national criteria 
of identity had to be modified in order to accommodate political claims over populations who 
spoke no Greek at all, or in the best of cases used Greek as a second language. 
The attempt was undertaken by specific groups of nationalist intellectuals whose leading figures 
were members of the staff of Athens University, journalists, schoolteachers and diplomatic 
personnel staffing some of the most critical posts in Macedonia.9 This involved three different, 
although interrelated stages. In the first place linguistic diversity within the Greek national 
community had to be accounted for. Second, alternative criteria of national identity had to be 
established. And third, nationalist discourse attempted to bolster up the Greek cause by 
underlining the "unique" cultural qualities of the Greeks, thus appropriating culture and 
civilisation exclusively for the Greek community. By the end of the 19th century this 
issue was directly addressed in books, pamphlets, and articles discussing questions 
of national politics with particular reference to the situation in Ottoman Macedonia. 
Linguistic diversity within the Greek national community was not dealt with as an 
isolated phenomenon, but there were attempts to explain it within the dominant 
discourse of historical continuity. Eventually, nationalist discourse on Macedonia 
drew upon the historical narratives produced by K. Paparrigopoulos and others.10 The 
latter conceived history as a linear and nationally meaningful process where events 
piled one upon the other in a chronological sequence representing the movement of 
the Greek nation through time. As is well known, this historical schema 
accommodated both glory and decline. Linguistic "de-hellenisation" {αφελληνισμός) 
was posed and explained as an aspect of national decline. Greek historical narratives 
presented Macedonia and Macedonian history as an intrinsic component of Greek 
history even before the days of Philip II and Alexander the Great, when the political 
unification of the Greek nation was first realised. In this view, Macedonia remained 
Greek throughout antiquity and the early Byzantine period until the "barbaric" 
invasions of the seventh century A.D.11 As a consequence Macedonia saw a new 
wave of foreign domination coupled with Slavic settlement. Although the Byzantines 
emerged victorious and the Bulgarian kingdoms were suppressed, Bulgarian 
settlements remained in the land. According to these narratives it was during 
Ottoman occupation that a major change took place. It was at that time that Greeks 
began to abandon the use of the Greek language, adopting the language of their 
Bulgarian co-orthodox neighbors. 
This issue was addressed in a memorandum sent by some of the leading figures of 
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the Greek Orthodox community in Constantinople to the representatives of the European powers 
at the outset of the San Stefano Treaty in March 1878.12 In it they claim that although many 
Greeks had abandoned use of the Greek language, adopting a Slavic idiom as a means of 
communication with their Slavic neighbours, they had, nevertheless, fully retained their 
nationality and national character. Additionally, emphasis was laid upon the extinction of the 
post-Byzantine educational infrastructure, an effect of the Ottoman occupation which 
undermined the teaching of the Greek language. Other reasons were also cited. I. Kalostipis saw 
in medieval linguistic development not only ethnic but social divisions as well. Greeks being 
socially dominant as city-dwellers, landowners, clerics, and merchants, had to learn Slavic 
dialects in order to communicate with the Bulgarians. Bulgarians, on the other hand, being 
entirely tied to agriculture, "coarse and ignorant by nature" were not in a position to learn Greek.13 
N. Kazazis repeats this argument. He claims that Greeks learned Slavic idioms only to 
communicate with the Slavs who being "sloth and mentally blunt by nature" were unable to learn 
the difficult Greek language, adding that this happened at a time when the Ottoman 
administration persecuted speakers of Greek throughout the Empire.14 According to Ch. 
Christovassilis, Greeks were forced to adopt the Slavic language, and in the long run to make it 
their own, because they thought it expedient for purposes of avoiding the child-levy (devsirme) 
imposed on them by the Ottoman administration. "When [the Greeks] realised that the Sultan 
spared Bulgarian children from this levy they adopted the Slavic idiom so as to show that they 
were not Greeks and thus to save their own children from the Turkish claws."15 
Despite these developments, the 
argument goes, the Greek 
language did not disappear 
altogether, as it extensively 
affected non-Greek idioms. Thus, 
Greeks did not simply adopt 
foreign languages, at least not 
without affecting them in turn. In 
this context the Slavic spoken in 
Macedonia is not considered a 
pure Slavic idiom but rather a 
mixed Greek-Slavic dialect. The Greeks imposed parts of their lexicon onto the Slavs at the same 
time as they adopted the Slavic language. "In Macedonia and Thrace something remarkable 
happened. It was not only Greeks who, due to fear and social need, chose the use of another 
language, but many of the newcomers (Bulgarians) through intermarriage with the Greeks did 
adopt many Greek words and Slavicised them by adding Slavic endings. Thus this mixed Slavo-
Greek idiom not only is more eloquent than that used by northerners but it is also unintelligible 
to them."16 K. Tsioulkas in his Συμβολαί ε/ς την διγλωσσίαν των Μακεδόνων attempted to show 
that the Slavic, or "Slavic in appearance" as he called it, idiom of Macedonia was in fact the 
ancient Greek Macedonian language.17 Ion Dragoumis with his well known rhetorical eloquence 
claimed that the Slavic idiom of Macedonia was not a Bulgarian language at all.18 Later on V. 
Colokotronis, in his attempt to prove the close racial affiliation of Greeks and Macedonian Slavs, 
placed strong emphasis on the Greek basis of the Slavic idiom in Macedonia.19 
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The Koutsovlach language is treated in the same way, as a Greek Latin idiom that was only 
intelligible within a similar context. "Les Valaques comme langue maternelle se servent 
d'habitude d'un idiome greco-latin, c'est à dire de mots issus du latin et du grec. En 
étudiant...cet idiome on remarque qu'il est mélangé de grec ancien et moderne avec ou sans 
terminations grecques."20 P. Kanellidis in his turn argued that the Vlach idiom had nothing in 
common with the Romanian language and that although grammatically influenced by the Latin 
its vocabulary was composed of Greek, Latin, and Albanian words.21 Thus, it was claimed, the 
Greek language, although it had disappeared in its pure form, held its ground partly by 
influencing linguistic development within non-Greek-speaking communities. 
This approach is only an instance of a more general perception of the non-Greek-speaking 
Christians, the case of Macedonia being presented as simply an aspect of a more widely 
diffused phenomenon. Similar examples were further adduced to corroborate the validity of the 
argument about Macedonia. The example of the Turkish-speaking Christians thought to be part 
of the Greek national community is extensively used by Greek nationalist discourse. Kalostipis 
referred to the "Turkish-speaking Christians of Attalia who spoke no Greek but thought of 
themselves as Greeks" and compared them to the Greek-speaking Muslims who had emigrated 
from the Péloponnèse in 1821 and "hated everything Greek."22 N. Kazazis refers also to the 
Turkish-speaking Greeks who had dropped the use of the Greek language due to extreme 
Turkish oppression: "I met with people who ignore the Greek language, the language of their 
ancestors... [there are] Turkish-speaking, Arabic-speaking, Armenian-speaking Greeks ... 
whose mother tongue is not Greek. They dropped the use [of the Greek language] during the 
time of oppression...."23 Addressing the question of the non-Greek-speaking Christians of Syria 
and Palestine, P. Karolidis, a professor of history at Athens University, put forward a similar 
analysis following the historical schema already applied to Macedonia. Discussing the case of 
"Arabic-speaking Greeks" in connection with the issue of the Orthodox Patriarchal See in 
Jerusalem, Karolidis attributed the abandoning of the use of Greek by the "Greeks in Syria and 
Palestine" and the adoption of Arabic to the Arab conquest of the area.24 
All in all, the loss of Greek language was attributed to unfortunate historical circumstances at a 
time when the Greek nation was [politically] in decline. In fact, linguistic Slavisation was 
perceived as an aspect and a symptom of overall decline. However, or so the argument goes, 
historical circumstances and linguistic developments did not break the bonds of national 
community. In the absence of linguistic evidence other criteria of national identity were invented. 
Briefly the nationalist discourse insisted that linguistic "de-hellenisation" did not necessarily lead 
to the loss of national consciousness. For, although many Greeks adopted foreign languages, 
they never lost their ties with Hellenism, which conserved itself as an entity. Consciousness, 
therefore, emerged as the ordering principle of community, as an all-inclusive concept able to 
accommodate both Greek-speaking and non-Greek-speaking populations.25 Consciousness was 
perceived as a primordial quasi-metaphysical sentiment, shared by many, if not all, "non-Greek-
speaking Greeks" and shaping not only individual but collective behaviour as well. 
Consciousness was the key category in the construction of the symbolic realm of national 
identity. 
To be nationally meaningful consciousness had to express itself in a manifest way and this 
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could be achieved only in connection to specific institutions, most importantly the Orthodox 
Church: loyalty to the Patriarchate of Constantinople was taken as an unmistakable indicator of 
national consciousness. But in this case it was loyalty to the Orthodox ecclesiastic hierarchy 
and not adherence to Orthodox doctrine that mattered. 
The allegiance of non-Greek-speaking Christians to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of 
Constantinople as opposed to the Bulgarian Exarchate was interpreted as an indication of 
national sentiment and as a clear expression of national consciousness. In addition the 
[ecclesiastical] schism of 1872 was expressly interpreted in national terms and the 
ecclesiastical disputes that followed were set in the context of national rivalry. "The Schism has 
become Hellenism's most important weapon against Bulgarian aspirations. Due to the Schism 
the churches directly related to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, being thoroughly 
Greek in character, retained their [political] privileges," claimed P. Karolidis.26 Another writer 
insisted that "[t]he [Bulgarian] Schism proved to be the strongest barrier of Hellenism against 
Bulgarian propaganda," because "it enabled Slavic-speaking Orthodox Greeks in Macedonia to 
manifest their loyalty to their religious and national traditions represented by the Ecumenical 
patriarchate..."27 
The nationalist discourse also underscored the "Greek character" of the Eastern Orthodox 
church -even of Orthodox Christianity in general28 - in various ways. It was argued that since 
Hellenism fused with Christianity in late antiquity, Eastern Orthodox Christianity, and the 
Orthodox church in particular, became the ark that saved the Greek nation during the hard times 
which followed the destruction of Byzantium. According to this discourse, the Greek nation was 
seeped in Orthodoxy to such an extent as to become inextricably bound to it. Although the 
establishing of this link did leave room for other national communities to claim similar bonds 
with Orthodoxy, the "Greekness" of the Orthodox church was not in question. The church was 
taken as another centre of the Greek nation, as the head of "Hellenism in captivity", and its 
"national" character remained unquestioned even in extremely critical writings castigating the 
policies pursued by the Patriarchate of Constantinople since the eruption of the ecclesiastical 
schism.29 It is no coincidence that this line of argumentation was extended to the case of non-
Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians in Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine, where national and 
ecclesiastical antagonism did make their presence felt by the end of the 19th century, although 
not in the bitter form that is known in the case of Macedonia and Thrace.30 Again, loyalty to the 
Orthodox church and the institutions of the Orthodox communities were treated as an 
unmistakable sign of Greek national consciousness. 
In addition to the criterion of ecclesiastic loyalty, nationalist discourse privileged another field of 
experience: enrollment in schools founded and run by Greek communities in Macedonia and 
elsewhere was granted a similar significance. "National life ... brought itself to a peak in 
education. Macedonia shows an active zeal towards the civilising endeavour to expand the 
Greek language, education and faith," stated I. Kalostipis as early as 1886.31 It is well known that 
the establishment of school networks in the Ottoman empire was a major initiative since the 
early 1870s. Although this network was not primarily designed to uphold national politics, it was 
eventually entangled in the national rivalry in Macedonia and elsewhere. Schools in Macedonia 
were financed by private associations and, increasingly, by the Greek state itself. Being a 
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novelty, especially in the agricultural areas of the Ottoman empire, schools were usually 
performing poorly. During the late 19th century, schools established by Greek, Bulgarian, 
Serbian and Romanian initiatives proliferated rapidly. As such, schools appealed to a broad 
audience and functioned not simply as educational units but as national symbols as well. It was 
on this level that a sharp national competition took place. Numbers of schools and school 
attendance were perceived as evidence of choices guided by national consciousness. This 
symbolic competition favored mostly the Greeks since their social and economic resources 
were far more powerful than those of their rivals. The Greek nationalist discourse heavily 
emphasised numbers of schools and school attendance. After all it was through schools that 
"non-Greek-speaking Greeks" would be enabled to regain their mother tongue. In addition, as 
school enrollment was quantifiable, it could provide a vivid illustration of national inclination in 
the form of (presumably self-evident) school statistics. Occasionally, it was even claimed that 
the Greek student population reflected the demographic preponderance of the Greek community 
over their rivals.32 No wonder that such statistics together with information on educational 
matters figured heavily in 
most pamphlets, books and 
articles supporting the Greek 
cause in Macedonia.33 
Predominance in education 
was symbolically extended to 
mean, at least to a national 
audience, overall national 
predominance in the area.34 
By insisting on ecclesiastic allegiance and school choice, nationalist discourse shifted the 
argument from the slippery surface of spoken language to a more stable ground. Alternative 
criteria of identity established alternative versions of community even at the expense of the 
dominant, language-oriented versions of national identity. Nationalist discourse did not limit 
itself to establishing convincing national criteria. It also attempted to procure a vision of the 
imaginary link of the Greek community with [Western] civilisation. Certainly this vision was not 
simply a response to the question of "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" but it was part of the more 
general discourse on national claims in Macedonia and elsewhere. In addition, this vision did 
not emerge in connection with the Macedonian question. Similar statements can be traced back 
to the 1840s, to mention only the well known speech of I. Kolletis in the Greek National 
Assembly in 1843-44,35 and even further back to the period of Greek Enlightenment. What is 
novel here is that Greek communities were represented as bearers of civilisation par excellence 
in a way that excluded any other community from claiming a similar link. In this case we are 
interested in the production of discursive stereotypes that associated particular communities 
with specific qualities.36 The Greek national community was invested with superior cultural traits 
which set it apart mainly, but not exclusively, from the Bulgarians. In this discursive 
configuration, particular fields of social experience were granted a privileged position. Social and 
cultural superiority were, supposedly, expressed in economic and educational predominance. 
Yet, this superiority was not simply projected against a comparative Balkan background. It 
allegedly derived from the intrinsic links of Greek culture with European culture. Appropriation of 
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[Western] culture and civilisation was an integral component of the Greek nationalist discourse 
in its attempt to connect the Greek cause, especially in Macedonia, with European values. This 
line of argumentation aimed at two different directions. The first direction was towards the 
Greek-speaking public. The Greek cause in Macedonia allowed the reaffirmation of the 
"privileged" position of the Greek nation vis-à-vis civilisation proper. The second was towards a 
broad European audience which supposedly favored Bulgarians and failed to recognise Greek 
rights in Macedonia and elsewhere.37 Legitimising national claims was set against a background 
of European politics and power games. 
III. The category of "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" was discursively constructed both in terms of 
discontinuity and continuity with previous discourses and in connection to an "existing reality" 
it purported to express. First, the discourse on "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" can be interpreted 
in terms of discontinuity. Attention to "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" leads to a 
reconceptualisation of language as a criterion of national belonging. The dominant conception 
of the Greek national identity, although not restricted to language alone, strongly emphasised the 
linguistic homogeneity of the Greek national community. The linguistic criterion could not be 
smoothly applied to Christians in Ottoman Macedonia and elsewhere. Linguistic criteria were 
even less convincing in a multilingual environment where language did not work as a dominant 
feature of identity among the people involved. Yet, the nationalist discourse had to 
accommodate claims on both Greek and non-Greek speaking populations. Eventually language 
as a criterion of identity had to be played down, even ignored, and other criteria were pushed to 
the fore. This was not without consequences on the structuring of Greek national identity. As 
language lost its privileged position, other criteria, such as those mentioned above, were 
invented to maintain the coherence of this structure. Accordingly, nationalist discourse 
concocted a different version of national community whereby the meaning of language as a 
criterion of national community was reconceptualised and other elements of identity were 
privileged in its stead. This new conception classified Christians according to new criteria of 
identity, allowing for the redefinition of the boundaries of national community in the contested 
areas of the Ottoman empire. However, the dislocation of the language criterion from its 
erstwhile position in the case of the "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" was not taken to its logical 
conclusion, i.e. the complete exclusion of linguistic criteria of national identity. 
The elaboration of this discontinuity reveals the way these novel orientations interacted with the 
original conceptual framework they departed from. Nationalist discourse is a system of 
representation of reality and both its mechanisms and demonstrative strategies are directly 
related to the categories of perception that go back to the conditions of its production. In this 
case what matters most is the manner in which the category of the "non-Greek-speaking 
Greeks" is brought to our attention: as a community(ies) using a particular language. In other 
words these communities were identified and approached on the basis of their linguistic profile. 
No community was thinkable without consideration of its linguistic status. This was the case 
because language as a criterion of nationality was so thoroughly inscribed into perceptions of 
the Greek national identity that it was thought to be an intrinsic part of it. Until the discovery of 
"non-Greek-speaking Greeks", language was among the yardsticks of national community. In 
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this context the linguistic status of these communities was impossible to be ignored; it was 
indeed the first feature to attract attention. Accordingly, the perception of the "non-Greek-
speaking Greeks" worked in two ways. It lead to a reconceptualisation of language as criterion 
of national identity and extended the imaginary boundaries of the Greek national community, 
without, however, destroying the linguistic criterion of national community. 
This contradiction is evident in two ways. First, the new conceptualisation of language, and its 
consequences, did not lead to a new theory of the connection between language and nation.38 
As already mentioned, the emergence of the "non-Greek-speaking Greek communities" was 
treated as an historical accident. Second, language was extensively used as evidence of Greek 
nationality in many other cases. 
It should be noted in this respect that the elaboration of the category of the "non- Greek-speaking 
Greeks" drew upon the conceptual framework developed in the context of the "Language 
Question" in Greece. During the 1880s the language controversy was rekindled after a long 
interval along a well trodden pattern: emphasis on the use of demotic language versus the use 
of an invented learned language (katharevousa). This is not the place to expand on this issue 
and a brief comment will do. Language disputes first erupted in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries among Greek speaking intellectuals influenced by theories of the European 
Enlightenment. One of the major products of the Greek Enlightenment was the reappraisal of 
ancient Greece as one of the main points of reference, as the 
ideal past and the symbolic field of comparison.39 Within the 
intellectual tradition of the Greek Enlightenment special attention 
was accorded language as the main criterion of community and 
specific questions were asked as to the linguistic state of the 
"Greek nation" in comparison to its ideal past. The loss of 
linguistic standards was only too obvious to ignore, and the 
linguistic developments leading to the shaping of demotic Greek 
were directly ascribed to the political decline of the Greek nation 
and to the foreign occupation that caused it. Intellectuals like A. 
Korais and P. Kodrikas, although in strong disagreement on most 
other linguistic issues, were in accord on this aspect. The loss of 
linguistic standards of ancient Greek was considered tantamount 
to the barbarisation {εκβαρβάρωσις) of the Greek language 
itself.40 
This argument was again employed during the new phase of 
linguistic conflicts. Supporters of katharevousa perceived 
demotic Greek as a compound of dialects the use of which was 
blocking the establishment of a learned Greek language. Again 
demotic Greek was directly linked to the period of decline and 
represented as a product of "slavery".41 The portrayal of the "non-
Greek-speaking Greeks" on a similar historical canvas placed 
them on an equal footing with other Greek communities which 
having retained some form of Greek had, nevertheless, 
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abandoned formal and learned linguistic standards altogether. In this way the discourse on "non-
Greek-speaking Greeks" re-enacted the historical drama already rehearsed in Greek nationalist 
discourse and made the inclusion of these communities into the Greek national community 
possible. Political decline, with all its rhetorical synecdoches, is used as a model of 
interpretation. Departure from the ideal past is not without consequences. As the Greek nation 
declined, some of its fundamental characteristics were attenuated. In the linguistic field this 
regression was reduced to the perversion of the forms of the ideal language. If demotic Greek 
was a linguistic product of slavery and foreign occupation then other linguistic forms could also 
be accommodated within this discourse, the case of "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" being one of 
them. 
Furthermore, the discourse on "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" also reinforced the religious 
component of the national identity. Orthodoxy was certainly already well entrenched in Greek 
nationalist discourse. The religious dimension was already effective during the Greek war of 
independence, especially among the people, and maintained its influence well after the 
establishment of the Greek state. It is also known that the influence of Orthodox tradition 
strengthened its hold on both the literate and illiterate during the 1850s.42 However, it is not 
Orthodoxy that interests me here but the Orthodox hierarchy whose position vis-à-vis the Greek 
nation had been represented in various conflicting ways. Although Orthodoxy was hardly ever 
questioned as a defining feature of the Greek nation, the Orthodox hierarchy was frequently 
treated with suspicion, even outright rejection from the time of the Greek Enlightenment up to 
the 1870s.43 The discourse on the "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" reveals the way allegiance to 
the Orthodox hierarchy was established as an indication of Greek national conscience. It was 
only in connection to the Macedonian question and other similar issues that the Orthodox 
hierarchy came to be included into the symbolic realm of the Greek nationalist discourse in an 
unquestionable way. It was only then that the Greek character of the church and of the Orthodox 
hierarchy was repeatedly affirmed, despite frequent charges against Orthodox clerics who 
supposedly pursued anti-national policies. This line of argumentation was not limited to the 
Christians communities of the Ottoman provinces in the Balkans but was extended to the 
Orthodox communities in Asia Minor and Syria.44 By introducing loyalty to the Patriarchate as a 
criterion of national consciousness, nationalist discourse effected a nationalisation of the church 
itself, representing this "ecumenical" institution as a part of the Greek cause, a point of view 
which, incidentally, was readily accepted by rival nationalist discourses.45 
It should be noted that by strengthening the religious field in the way just described, the 
discourse on the "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" also reinforced the vision of modern Greece as 
heir to Byzantium. Again, Byzantium and Byzantine civilisation had already been integrated into 
the history of the Greek nation since the 1850s. By the time the edition of Paparrigopoulos' 
monumental work was concluded, the last traces of the Enlightenment tradition which despised 
Byzantine culture, treating it as synonymous to bigotry, had been erased.46 It is well established 
that the forging of the Byzantine link in the 1850s completed the chain of historical continuity 
and reinforced the influence of Orthodox and Byzantine tradition. My point is that the discovery 
of the "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" imaginatively linked the Byzantine tradition to living human 
beings and extended it beyond the borders of the small state to include Christians who did not 
speak Greek but who, it was argued, were nonetheless Greeks due to their religious allegiance, 
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which could be traced back to Byzantine times. In this manner the representation of the "non-
Greek-speaking Greek" communities coincided with the vision of the "Great Idea" which, based 
as it was on the imperial tradition of Byzantium, was incompatible with the territorial dimension 
of ancient Greece. As P. Karolidis put it: "Some not only insulted both ancient and modern 
Greece by sustaining that there is no relation between Hellenism and the Byzantine world, they 
went as far as suggesting that Byzantium is inimical to Greek culture.[...] [F]or them the rise of 
Greek culture was limited in the areas south of [Mount] Olympos and reappeared [only] in the 
new francolevantine Greek state."47 
This brings us to our last point. Discourse on "non-Greek-speaking Greeks" can be directly 
linked to national policies as it reinforced the ideological hegemony of the "Great Idea" form of 
nationalism in Greek politics. Being part of a broader discourse it attempted to reshape the 
boundaries of the Greek "community" by establishing truth claims on particular Christian 
communities in the Ottoman Empire. In that, it was not only working in relation to the shaping 
of Greek national interests in the face of rival national claims. It was not even the aspect of 
legitimacy of national claims, which were tightly linked to such truth claims, that mattered most. 
This discourse was mainly working towards imposing a form of national politics able to meet 
the "expectations" of communities already conceptually integrated into the Greek nation. Seen 
against the background of the bitter disappointment haunting Greek politics after the Greek-
Turkish war in 1897 this discourse remembered the "unfinished tasks" and nurtured a sense of 
national duty which, I think, strongly influenced the policies of the Greek state in Macedonia and 
elsewhere. 
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 This discussion draws mainly upon M. Foucault's approach of discourse as a system of statements that both 
enable and constrain thinking. See M. Foucault, "The Order of Discourse" in R. Young (ed.), Untying the Text; a 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:11:15 |
L a n g u a g e , c o m m u n i t y a n d t h e " n o n - G r e e k - s p e a k i n g G r e e k s " 
Poststructuralist Reader. London and New York, 1987. See also Foucautt's treatment ot discourse in The 
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1911, p. 128; K.I Mazarakis-Ainian, Η Αύσις του βαλκανικού Ζητήματος. Athens 1919, p. 18. 
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Monuments"). Athens, 1990, pp. 24-28. 
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report the Greek population in the area included large numbers of Slavic, Vlach [Koutsovlach] and Albanian-
speaking Christians. 
8
 It is noteworthy that Greek consular reports in the early 1870s referred to these Christians as Bulgarian-Greeks 
as opposed to Bulgarian-Slavs, obviously in an attempt to describe the right combination of language and 
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outlined by Sp. Zambelios in his Introduction to Άσματα Δημοτικά της Ελλάδος (Demotic Songs of Greece) 
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consciousness as a primordial, almost metaphysical, state of mind. 
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